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While an increased impact of cues on decision‐making has been associated with sub-
stance dependence, it is yet unclear whether this is also a phenotype of non‐
substance‐related addictive disorders, such as gambling disorder (GD). To better
understand the basic mechanisms of impaired decision‐making in addiction, we inves-
tigated whether cue‐induced changes in decision‐making could distinguish GD from
healthy control (HC) subjects. We expected that cue‐induced changes in gamble
acceptance and specifically in loss aversion would distinguish GD from HC subjects.
Thirty GD subjects and 30 matched HC subjects completed a mixed gambles task
where gambling and other emotional cues were shown in the background. We used
machine learning to carve out the importance of cue dependency of decision‐
making and of loss aversion for distinguishing GD from HC subjects.
Cross‐validated classification yielded an area under the receiver operating curve
(AUC‐ROC) of 68.9% (p = .002). Applying the classifier to an independent sample
yielded an AUC‐ROC of 65.0% (p = .047). As expected, the classifier used cue‐
induced changes in gamble acceptance to distinguish GD from HC. Especially,
increased gambling during the presentation of gambling cues characterized GD sub-
jects. However, cue‐induced changes in loss aversion were irrelevant for
distinguishing GD from HC subjects. To our knowledge, this is the first study to inves-
tigate the classificatory power of addiction‐relevant behavioral task parameters when
distinguishing GD from HC subjects. The results indicate that cue‐induced changes in
decision‐making are a characteristic feature of addictive disorders, independent of a
substance of abuse
KEYWORDS
decision‐making, gambling disorder, loss aversion, Pavlovian‐to‐instrumental transfer- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided
by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Society for the Study of Addiction
wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/adb 1 of 10
2 of 10 GENAUCK ET AL.1 | INTRODUCTION
Gambling disorder (GD) is characterized by continued gambling for
money despite severe negative consequences.1 Burdens of GD
include financial ruin, loss of social structures, as well as development
of psychiatric comorbidities.2 In line with this clinical picture of
impaired decision making, GD subjects have also displayed impaired
decision making in laboratory experiments.3,4
Besides impaired decision making, cue reactivity has been a cru-
cial concept in understanding addictive disorders including GD.5,6
Through Pavlovian conditioning, any neutral stimulus can become a
conditioned stimulus (i.e. a cue) if it has been paired with the effects
of the addictive behavior.7 In addictive disorders, including GD, cues
may induce attentional bias, arousal, and craving for the addictive
behavior in periods of abstinence.8,9 Treatment of addictive disor-
ders may focus on identifying and coping with individual cues that
induce craving for addictive behavior.10 If we understood better
how cues exert control over instrumental behavior and decision‐
making, we would be able to improve treatment tools and even pub-
lic health policy for GD and perhaps other addictive disorders. In the
present study we were thus interested in broadening our under-
standing of the basic mechanisms of impaired decision making in
addictions, especially with respect to cue‐induced effects on value‐
based decision making.
The effect of cues exhibiting a facilitating or inhibiting influence on
instrumental behavior and decision making is known as Pavlovian‐to‐
instrumental transfer (PIT).11 PIT experiments usually have three
phases: a first phase where subjects learn an instrumental behavior
to gain rewards or avoid punishments, a second phase where subjects
learn about the value of arbitrary stimuli through classical condition-
ing, and a third phase (the PIT phase), where subjects are supposed
to perform the instrumental task, while stimuli from the second phase
(changing from trial to trial) are presented in the background. The PIT
phase measures the effect of value‐charged cues on instrumental
behavior despite the fact that the background cues have no objective
relation to the instrumental task in the foreground. For instance, cer-
tain cues could increase the likelihood of gamble acceptance or the
sensitivity to the gain offered in the gamble. In the current study we
focus only on the PIT phase. PIT has recently drawn attention in the
study of substance use disorders (SUDs).12 This is because PIT effects
can persist even when the outcome of the instrumental behavior has
been devalued,13 and because increased PIT has been associated
with a marker for impulsivity14 and with decreased model‐based
behavior.15 Lastly, PIT effects tend to be stronger in subjects with a
SUD than in healthy subjects,12,16 and increased PIT has been associ-
ated with the probability of relapse.12
Increased PIT effects are based on Pavlovian and instrumental con-
ditioning and on their interaction. This highlights how addictive disor-
ders rely on learning mechanisms.17 GD is an addictive disorder
independent of any influence of a neurotropic substance of abuse.
The study of PIT in GD may thus further shed light on whether
increased PIT in addictive disorders is a result of learning, independent
of any substance of abuse, or even a congenital vulnerability.18We are aware of three studies that have observed in GD subjects
increased cue‐induced effects on decision‐making and instrumental
behavior, comparable with increased PIT effects. In two single‐group
studies, GD subjects have shown higher delay discounting (preferring
immediate rewards over rewards in the future) in response to a casino
environment versus a laboratory environment19 and to high‐craving
versus low‐craving gambling cues.20 In a third study, GD subjects have
been more influenced than HC subjects by gambling stimuli in a
response inhibition task.21 To our knowledge, however, there are no
studies yet that have investigated the effect of cue reactivity on loss
aversion in GD as a possibly relevant PIT effect in GD.
Loss aversion (LA) is, besides delay discounting, another facet of
value‐based decision‐making. It is the phenomenon wherein people
assign a greater value to potential losses than to an equal amount of
possible gains.22 For example, healthy subjects tend to agree to a coin
toss gamble (win/loss probability of 0.5) only if the amount of possible
gain is at least twice the amount of possible loss. In GD subjects, LA
seems to be reduced,23,24 but there are also studies that have found
no difference in LA between GD and HC subjects.25
High LA protects against disadvantageous gambling decisions.
However, it has been observed that LA can be transiently modulated
by experimentally controlled cues26 and that this LA modulation varies
considerably across subjects.27 In GD subjects, loss aversion might be
particularly cue‐dependent leading to reckless gambling especially in
casino contexts or at slot machines. In the current study, we thus
hypothesized that GD subjects should show stronger PIT effects than
HC subjects in their gambling decisions and especially stronger drops
in LA when e.g. gambling‐related cues are present (i.e. higher “loss
aversion PIT”).
So far, we have mentioned studies that have used group‐mean dif-
ference analyses to investigate decision making or cue reactivity in
addictive disorders. This approach is faithful to the desire to explain
human behavior rather than predict it.28 However, this may lead to
overly complicated (i.e. overfitted) models, which do not correctly pre-
dict human behavior in new samples.28 Thus, in the current study we
wanted to avoid overfitting and isolate a model with not only explan-
atory but also predictive value.28 We did so by disentangling the spe-
cific benefits of “loss aversion PIT” parameters when distinguishing
GD from HC subjects. Hence, we used machine learning methods in
addition to classical mean‐difference statistics to test our hypotheses.
This approach has drawn increasing attention in the field of clinical
psychology and psychiatry.29 In particular, we built and tested an algo-
rithm that decides between various loss aversion models and different
models with and without PIT to classify subjects into HC versus GD
groups. Importantly, to avoid overfitting, we used out‐of‐sample clas-
sification.30-32 Our results allowed us to disentangle which PIT effects
are relevant to distinguish GD from HC subjects.
When selecting cues for this study, we aimed at expanding on existing
studies investigating cue‐effects in GD.19-21 Besides gambling‐related
cues, we thus selected additional cues from different motivational and
emotional categories12 related to GD. These categories comprised
images used in gambling advertisements as well as for advertisement of
GD therapy and prevention (positive and negative cues).
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rate the modulation of loss aversion by gambling and other emotional
cues (“loss aversion PIT”) to distinguish between HC and GD subjects.2 | MATERIALS AND METHODS
2.1 | Samples
GD subjects were diagnosed using the German short questionnaire for
gambling behavior questionnaire (KFG).33 The KFG diagnoses subjects
according to DSM‐IV criteria for pathological gambling. Scoring 16
points and over means “likely suffering from pathological gambling”.
However, here we use the DSM‐5 term “gambling disorder” inter-
changeably, because the DSM‐IV and DSM‐5 criteria largely overlap.
The GD group were active gamblers and not in therapy. The HC group
consisted of subjects that had no to little experience with gambling,
reflecting the healthy general population as in other addiction stud-
ies.5 For further information on the sample, see Table 1 and Supple-
ment 1.1. GD and HC were matched on relevant variables
(education, net personal income, age, alcohol use), except for smoking
severity. We thus included smoking severity in the classifier and
tested it against classifying based only on smoking severity. For final
validation of the fitted classifier we used a sample from another study
where subjects performed the affective mixed gambles task in a func-
tional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) scanner (see Table S2).34TABLE 1 Sample characteristics, means and P values calculated by two‐
Variable HC group SE
Year in school 10.87 0.22
Vocational school 2.47 0.24
Net personal income 1207.37 118.12
Personal debt 7166.67 2277.95
Fagerström 1.53 0.41
Age 39.30 1.89
AUDIT 4.77 0.86
BDI‐II 5.94 0.95
SOGS 1.87 0.54
KFG 3.70 1.05
BIS‐15 32.40 1.15
GBQ persistence 2.18 0.21
GBQ illusions 3.18 0.26
Ratio female 0.30 ‐
Ratio unemployed 0.10 ‐
Ratio smokers 0.53 ‐
Ratio right‐handed 0.93 ‐
*Chi‐square test used; se: bootstrapped standard errors; years in school: years in
university; Fagerström: smoking severity. AUDIT: alcohol use severity; BDI II
pathological gambling; KFG: Kurzfragebogen zum Glücksspielverhalten, Short
measure based on the DSM‐IV; BIS: Barratt Impulsiveness Scale for impulsivity
naire, collecting gambling related cognitive distortions (Supplement 1.1).2.2 | Procedure and data acquisition
Subjects completed the task at theGeneral Psychology behavioral lab of
the Department of Psychology of Humboldt‐Universität zu Berlin. They
were sitting upright in front of a computer screen using their dominant
hand's fingers to indicate choices on a keyboard. Subjects were
attached five passive facial electrodes, two above musculus corrugator,
two above musculus zygomaticus, and one on the upper forehead. We
recorded electrodermal activity (EDA) from the non‐dominant hand.
Subjects of the validation sample completed the task in an fMRI envi-
ronment (head‐first supine in a 3‐Tesla SIEMENS TrioMRI at the BCAN
‐ Berlin Center of Advanced Neuroimaging). Results of the fMRI and
peripheral‐physiological recordings will be reported elsewhere.2.3 | Affective mixed gambles task
We were inspired by established tasks to measure general LA and LA
under the influence of affective cues.27,35 Subjects were each given 20€
for wagering. On every trial, subjects saw a cue that theywere instructed
tomemorize for a paid recognition task after the actual experiment. After
4s (jittered), a mixed gamble, involving a possible gain and a possible loss,
with probability P = .5 each, was superimposed on the cue. Subjects had
to choose how willing they were to accept the gamble (Figure 1A) on a
4‐point Likert‐scale to ensure task engagement.35 Subjects of an inde-
pendent validation sample completed the task in an fMRI scanner andsided permutation test
GD group SE P perm test
10.77 0.22 .837
2.77 0.26 .464
1419.67 174.51 .272
36166.67 11242.95 <.001
2.77 0.55 .081
41.40 2.33 .477
5.30 1.17 .755
12.83 1.88 .003
9.17 0.57 <.001
28.47 1.54 <.001
33.60 1.10 .468
3.24 0.20 .001
3.52 0.22 .334
0.23 ‐ 1.000*
0.30 ‐ .217*
0.67 ‐ .299*
0.93 ‐ 1.000*
primary and secondary school; vocational school: vocational school and/or
: depressive symptoms, SOGS: South Oaks Gambling Screen to check for
Questionnaire Pathological Gambling, German diagnostic tool and severity
; GBQ persistence and GBQ illusions: from the Gamblers’ Beliefs Question-
FIGURE 1 The affective mixed gambles task. One trial is depicted. A, behavioral sample. B, fMRI validation sample. Subjects first saw a fixation
cross with varying inter‐trial‐interval (ITI, 2.5s to 5.5s, up to 8s in fMRI version; not displayed here). Subjects then saw a cue with different
affective content (67 of 67 gambling related, 45 of 31 with positive consequences of abstinence, 45 of 31 with negative consequences of
gambling, 45 of 24 neutral images) for about 4s. Subjects were instructed to remember the cue for a paid recognition task after all trials. Then a
gamble involving a possible gain and a possible loss was superimposed on the cue. Subjects were instructed to shift their attention at this point to
the proposed gamble and evaluate it. In the current example, a coin toss gamble was offered, where the subject could win 32 Euros or lose 11
Euros (50/50 probability). Position of gain and loss was counterbalanced (left/right). Gain was indicated by a '+' sign and loss by a '‐' sign. In the
behavioral sample, subjects had 4s to make a choice between four levels of acceptance (yes, somewhat yes, somewhat no, no; here translated
from German version that used “ja, eher ja, eher nein, nein”). In the fMRI sample, subjects had to wait 4s (jittered) before the response options
were shown. Direction of options (from left to right or vice versa) was random. Directly after decision, the ITI started. If subjects failed to make a
decision within 4s, ITI started and trial was counted as missing. ca.: circa, RT: reaction time
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Gambles were created by randomly drawing with replacement from a
matrix with possible gambles consisting of 12 levels of gains (14, 16, … ,
36) and 12 levels of losses (‐7, ‐8, … , ‐18). This matrix is apt to elicit LA
in healthy subjects.23,35 Outcomes of the gambles were never presented
during the task but subjects were informed that after the experiment five
of their gamble decisions with ratings of “somewhat yes” or “yes” would
be randomly chosen and played for real money. As affective cues, four
sets of images were assembled: 1) 67 gambling images, showing a variety
of gambling scenes, and paraphernalia (gambling cues) 2) 31 images
representing negative consequences of gambling (negative cues) 3) 31
images representing positive effects of abstinence fromgambling (positive
cues): 4) 24 neutral IAPS images (neutral cues). For further information on
validation of the cue categories and on access to the stimuli, please see
Supplement 1.2. We presented cues of all categories in random
order and each gambling cue once. For negative, positive, and neutral
cue categories, we randomly drew images from each pool until we had
presented 45 images of each category and each image at least once.
Hence, we ran 202 trials in each subject. Gambles were matched on
average across cue categories according to expected value, variance,
gamble simplicity, as well as mean and variance of gain and loss, respec-
tively. Gamble simplicity is defined as Euclidean distance from diagonal
of gamble matrix (ed).35 HC showed on average 1.00 missed trial, GD
1.05 (no significant group difference, F = 0.022, P = .882). In fMRI
validation study, HC: 3.13, GD: 4.10, (no significant group difference, F
= 0.557, P = .457).2.4 | Subjective cue ratings
After the task, subjects rated all cues using the Self‐Assessment Man-
ikin (SAM) assessment36 (reporting on valence: happy vs. unhappy,
arousal: energized vs. sleepy, dominance: in control vs. being con-
trolled) and additional visual analogue scales: 1) “How strongly does
this image trigger craving for gambling?” 2) “How appropriately does
this image represent one or more gambling games?” 3) “How appropri-
ately does this image represent possible negative effects of gambling?”
4) “How appropriately does this image represent possible positive
effects of gambling abstinence?”. All scales were operated via a slider
from 0 to 100.
All cue ratings were z‐standardized within subject. Ratings were
analyzed one‐by‐one using linear mixed‐effects regression, using lmer
from the lme4 package in R,37 where cue category (and clinical group)
denoted the fixed effects and subjects and cues denoted the sources
of random effects.
2.5 | Estimating subject‐specific parameters from
behavioral choice data
We modeled each subject's behavioral data by submitting dichoto-
mized choices (somewhat no, no: 0; somewhat yes, yes: 1) into logistic
regressions. We dichotomized choices to increase the precision when
estimating behavioral parameters, in line with previous studies using
the mixed gambles task.23,35 Regressors for subject‐wise logistic
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centered) from the mixed gamble, as well as gamble simplicity (ed),
loss‐gain ratio and cue category of the stimulus in the background of
the mixed gamble. We defined different logistic regressions by using
different trial‐based definitions of gamble value (Q) (see Table S1),
submitted to the logistic function:
P gamble acceptanceð Þ ¼ 1= 1þ exp −Qð Þð Þ (1)
Different trial‐based definitions of gamble value (Q) reflected two
things:
1) Different ways of modeling LA may be adequate to distinguish a
GD from a HC subject23,25,27,35 (Table S1).
2) Different ways of incorporating cue effects on decision‐making
(PIT effects) may be adequate to distinguish a GD from a HC sub-
ject. For example, the model lac assumes
Q lacð Þ ¼ Q lað Þ þ cT*βc (2)
where
Q lað Þ ¼ β0 þ xgain*βgain þ xloss*βloss (3)
where β0 is the intercept, xgain the objective gain value of the gamble,
βgain the regression weight for xgain (same holds for xloss and βloss,
respectively), and c the dummy‐coded column vector indicating the
category of the current cue and βc a column vector holding the regres-
sion weights for the categories. Lac thus is a weighted linear combina-
tion of objective gain, objective loss with an additive influence of cue
category. That is, some influence of cue category on decision‐making
(PIT) is modeled. Note that we have multiple PIT effects here, because
βc is a vector of length three, reflecting the three affective categories
(gambling, negative, positive) different from neutral. There were also
models that did not incorporate any influence of loss aversion or
category (intercept‐only, a), or just of category (ac), or just of loss aver-
sion (la) or of their interaction (laci):
Q lacið Þ ¼ Q lað Þ þ cT*βc þ xgain*cT*βgain;c þ xloss*cT*βloss;c (4)
A model selection procedure could thus choose whether cue‐
induced effects on loss aversion (“loss aversion PIT”, i.e. the lacimodel)
were important or not to distinguish between GD and HC subjects.
Logistic regressions were fit using maximum likelihood estimation
within the glm function in R.38 Resulting regression parameters were
extracted per model (e.g. β0, βgain, βloss for model la) and subject. We
appended the loss aversion parameter (λ) to the estimated coefficients
by computing for each subject and pair of βgain, βloss:
λ ¼ −βloss
βgain
(5)
Models with names incorporating a “c” (e.g. lac or laci) are those that
assume some influence of the cues (i.e. PIT effects). Models laCh, laChci
are from.27 Note that per model each subject thus had a characteristic
parameter vector (the estimated regression weights, plus, in theexpanded case, the loss aversion coefficients) and all subjects’ parame-
ter vectors belonging to a certain model constituted the model's param-
eter set. There were 13 different ways (i.e. models) to extract the
behavioral parameters per subject plus 8 expansions by computing the
loss aversion parameters after model estimation (Table S1), i.e. 21
parameter sets. In a separate analysis, the models were estimated with
adjustment for cue repetition (using one additional two‐level factor in
each single‐subject model) and by randomly selecting 45 gambling cues
out of 67, to equalize the number of trials per cue category.2.6 | Classification
Our machine learning approach is based on regularized regression
and cross‐validation as used in other machine learning studies in
addiction and psychological research.30,31,392.6.1 | Overall reasoning in building the classifier
The main interest of our study was to assess whether cue‐induced
changes in decision‐making during an affective mixed gambles task
can be used to distinguish GD from HC subjects. We hypothesized
that shifts in loss aversion that depend on what cues are shown in
the background (“loss aversion PIT”) should best distinguish between
GD and HC subjects. This means, the laci model's parameter set
should have been the most effective in distinguishing between GD
and HC subjects. To test this hypothesis, we used a machine learning
algorithm based on regularized logistic regression that selected among
various competing parameter sets (from the 21 different models, la,
lac, laci, etc.) the set that best distinguished HC and GD subjects.
To assess the generalizability of the resultant classifier, we used
cross‐validation (CV).30,32,39,40 Generalizability estimates the predictive
power, and hence replicability, of a classifier in new samples.28 Note
that machine learning algorithms are designed to generalize well to
new samples by inherently avoiding overfitting to the training data.41
We computed a P value of the algorithm denoting the probability that
its classification performance was achieved under a baseline model
(predicting using only smoking severity as predictor variable).
Beyond cross‐validation, which uses only one data set (splitting it
repeatedly into training and test data set), validation of a classifier
on a completely independent sample is the gold‐standard in machine
learning to assess the quality of an estimated model.28 Hence, we
estimated the generalization performance also via application of
our classifier to a completely independent sample of HC and GD
subjects, who had performed a slightly adapted version of the task
in an fMRI scanner. A P value was computed, as above, with random
classification as the baseline model. For detailed information on esti-
mating the classifier, please see Supplement 1.4 and Figure S1. For
classical analyses of group comparisons regarding gamble acceptance
rate and loss aversion parameters, please see Supplement 1.6. In a
separate analysis, we ran the classification with the model parame-
ters adjusted for cue repetition and with equalized number of trials
per cue category.
FIGURE 2 Behavioral results. A, Empirical mean acceptance rate with 95% CI's. Means were computed over subjects’ means in the categories.
Mean acceptance rate was significantly higher in GD subjects during gambling stimuli (p = 0.004). CIs are bootstrapped from category means of
subjects. B, Assessment of AUC‐ROC of classifier: Plot shows density estimates of the area under the receiver‐operating curve when running the
baseline classifier (red) /the full classifier (turquoise) 1000 times to predict the class label of 60 subjects. The green line shows the mean AUC
performance of the estimated classifier across CV rounds. C, Classifier validation on fMRI sample. Plot shows the estimated density of AUC‐ROC
under random classification. The green line shows the performance of the combined 1000 classifiers on the fMRI data set. D, Winning model for
classification. Standardized regression parameters and their confidence intervals (percentiles across cross‐validation rounds). The algorithm mainly
used the shift in acceptance rate in response to gambling cues in order to detect GD subjects
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Subjects gave written informed consent. The study was conducted in
accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki and approved by the
ethics committee of Charité – Universitätsmedizin Berlin.3 | RESULTS
3.1 | Cue ratings
Gambling cues were seen as more appropriately representing one or
more gambling games than any other cue category: gambling > neutral
(β = 1.589, P < .001), gambling > negative (β = 1.197, P < .001), gam-
bling > positive (β = 1.472, P < .001). They elicited more craving in GD
subjects (β = 0.71, P < .001). Negative cues were seen as evoking more
negative feelings in both groups (β = ‐0.775, P < .001) and were seen
as representing negative effects of gambling, more than any other cat-
egory (Supplement 2.1). Positive cues were indeed seen as more rep-
resentative for positive effects of gamble abstinence than any other
category (Figure S2).3.2 | Prediction of group using behavioral data
The classification algorithm yielded an AUC‐ROC of 68.9% (under 0‐
hypothesis, i.e. with only smoking as predictor: 55.1%, P = .002) (Fig-
ures 2B and S4). The most often selected model was the “acceptancerate per category” (ac) model (90.7% of the rounds). Combined with
the models laec, lac in 95.8% of the rounds a model was used that
incorporated PIT, i.e. an effect of cue category on decisions (Figure
S5). In only 9.3% of the rounds a model was selected that incorporated
loss aversion (i.e. gain and loss sensitivities). Validating the estimated
classifier in the independent sample, the classifier yielded an AUC‐
ROC of 65.0% (under random classification: 55.3%, P = .047) (Figure
2C). Adjusting for cue repetition and equalizing the number of trials
across cue categories lead to very similar AUR‐ROC scores, the ac
model was still the most often chosen model (42%), otherwise laec_LA
and lac were chosen very often (Supplement 2.4).
3.3 | Inspection of classifier
Inspecting the classifier's logistic regression weights, we saw that the
classifier places most importance on the shift in gambling acceptance
during gambling cues (see Figure 2D). Note further that the classifier
places also some importance on the sensitivity to the negative cues
but deselects the sensitivity to positive cues.3.4 | Acceptance rate and loss aversion under cue
conditions
Overall acceptance rate between groups was not significantly differ-
ent (HC: 53%, GD: 58%, P = .169, ΔAIC = 0). Across all subjects there
was a significant effect of cue category on acceptance rate (P < .001,
ΔAIC = 648), driven by the effect of positive and negative cues. There
GENAUCK ET AL. 7 of 10was a significant interaction with group (P = .002, ΔAIC = 9). There,
GD subjects showed significantly higher acceptance rate during gam-
bling cues than HC subjects (HC: 49%, GD: 68%, pWaldApprox =
0.003) (Figure 2A), and there were no more cue effects in the HC
group and no other significant cue effect differences between HC
and GD.
The fixed effects for gain sensitivity, absolute loss sensitivity, and LA
over all trials for HC (0.26, 0.42, and 1.64) were descriptively larger than
for GD (0.19, 0.22, and 1.13). Testing the interaction between group,
gain, and loss (i.e. testing for difference of LA between groups) via
nested model comparison, yielded P < .001, ΔAIC = 93, with sensitivity
to loss being significantly smaller in GD subjects pWaldApprox = 0.011.
Loss aversion was significantly smaller in GD than in HC (pperm <
0.001). Loss aversion shifts due to category did not differ between
groups (Supplement 2.2).4 | DISCUSSION
Gambling disorder (GD) is characterized by impaired decision making4
and craving in response to gambling associated images.9 However, it is
unclear whether specific cue‐induced changes in loss aversion exist that
distinguish GD from HC subjects. In order to better understand the
basic mechanisms of impaired decision‐making in addiction, we thus
used a machine‐learning algorithm to determine the relevance of cue‐
induced changes on loss aversion (“loss aversion PIT”) in distinguishing
GD from HC subjects. We hypothesized that cue‐induced changes in
gamble acceptance and especially a strong shift of loss aversion by gam-
bling and other affective cues should distinguishGD fromHC subjects (i.
e. the model representing this effect should have been chosen most
often by the algorithm to distinguish GD from HC subjects). To our
knowledge, our study is the first to investigate the classificatory power
of addiction‐relevant behavioral task parameters when distinguishing
GD from HC subjects. Moreover, we are not aware of any study specif-
ically investigating the relevance of behavioral PIT effects in character-
izing addicted subjects using predictive modeling.
Our algorithmwas significantly better in distinguishing GD fromHC
subjects than the control model, which only used smoking severity as a
predictor variable (cross‐validated AUC‐ROC of 68.9% vs. 55.1%, P =
.002). In an independent validation sample the classifier was almost as
accurate (AUC‐ROC of 65.0% vs. 55.3%, P = .047). When classifying
subjects, in 93% of the estimation rounds, our algorithm chose a model
with some influence of the cue categories on choices. The most fre-
quently chosen model was the ac model (85%), i.e. a model only
accounting for mean shifts in acceptance rate depending on cue cate-
gory. PIT‐related variables could therefore successfully discriminate
between GD and HC subjects. We saw that especially the tendency of
subjects to gamble more during the presentation of gambling cues was
indicative of the subject belonging to the GD group. Contrary to what
we expected, “loss aversion PIT” was not useful in distinguishing
between GD and HC subjects. In other words, the algorithm never
selected the lacimodel, which included the modulation of gain and loss
sensitivity by cue categories.We also did not see this in univariate groupcomparisons. “Loss aversion PIT” might thus not play a role
in distinguishing GD from HC subjects. However, small sample size,
as in the present study, may limit the possible complexity of a
classifier.42(p237) It cannot be ruled out that larger andmore diverse sam-
ples in future studies may produce classifiers allocating at least minor
importance to “loss aversion PIT”.
We observed that both GD and HC subjects perceived the cues as
intended. GD subjects reported higher craving for gambling in
response to gambling stimuli as seen in other studies.9 Our results
may thus be interpreted as cue reactivity leading to more automatic
decision‐making in GD subjects. Note that this does not mean that
GD subjects simply show higher vigor or more disinhibition to press
a button, as in some PIT designs.43 Instead, since the required motor
response for saying yes or no changed randomly, gamblers seemed
to be indeed more inclined to decide in favor of gambling when gam-
bling cues were shown in the background. Especially because cue
influence on LA was not relevant for distinguishing GD from HC sub-
jects, but instead cue influence on general acceptance rate, this may
be seen as GD subjects responding more habitually and in a less
goal‐directed manner15 when gambling cues are visible.
In the current study, the classifier also put some importance on
behavior under negative cues, and, descriptively but not significantly,
GD subjects tended to reduce gambling more in the face of negative
cues than HC subjects. Future studies should explore the possible
power of negative images to inhibit gambling in larger and more het-
erogeneous GD samples.
Our results show the gambling promoting effects of gambling cues
in GD subjects. Alcohol and tobacco advertisement promote alcohol
and tobacco use44 and advertisement bans and counter‐active labels
on alcohol and tobacco goods help reduce consumption.45 Our results
suggest that much like advertisement for these substances, visual
stimuli in gambling halls and on slot machines may also increase PIT
effects. Policy makers may consider our results as another piece of
evidence that gambling advertisement is not different from alcohol
and tobacco advertisement and that respective advertisement regula-
tion perhaps should be extended.
We are not aware of any machine learning studies that have
assessed the relevance of a behavioral task measure in characterizing
GD. Using this approach, we observed a cross‐validated classification
performance of AUC‐ROC = 0.68. We are aware of one machine
learning study that built and tested a classifier in 160 GD patients
and matched controls based on personality questionnaire self‐report,
reaching an AUC‐ROC = 0.77.31 Studies in the field of substance‐
based addiction, using behavioral markers and machine learning for
classification, report cross‐validated AUC‐ROC's of 0.71 to 0.90 for
cross‐validated classification performance.30,39 However, the men-
tioned studies used a whole array of different informative variables
while the current studied tried to carve out the relevance of one basic
behavioral mechanism while controlling for all covariates of no‐
interest.
Our results may be a first building block in creating more advanced
and more multivariate diagnostic tools for GD and other addictive dis-
orders, especially when combined with other high‐performing
8 of 10 GENAUCK ET AL.discriminating features, such as personality profiles and scores from
other decision‐making tasks. Further, our results invite more in‐depth
scrutiny of decision‐making in GD subjects during the presence of
cues, e.g. on neural level.34 Moreover, the above machine learning
studies did not use an independent validation sample to corroborate
their results. Our independent validation yielded an AUC‐ROC of
0.65. This supports the validity of our findings of increased PIT in GD.
5 | STRENGTHS AND LIMITATIONS
When carving out the relevance of PIT, we did notmatch for depression
score (BDI) because, epidemiologically, GD is associated with high
depression scores,46 meaning it could be seen as a feature of GD. Fur-
ther, the evidence on the association of PIT and depression is inconclu-
sive.47,48 However, PITmight play some role in depression and thus also
in GD subjects. Future studies should thus address the modulatory
effect of depressive symptoms in GD on PIT.49
The current classifier was slightly less effective in the independent
validation sample than estimated using cross‐validation (AUC = 65.4%
vs. 68.0%). This might have occurred due to the use of an fMRI version
of the affective mixed gambles task in the validation sample. It
included an additional decision‐making period, during which subjects
could not yet answer. This may have led to slight changes in responses
with respect to the cue categories. However, this could be seen as a
strength since our classifier still performed better than chance. And
classifiers that are robust against slight changes in the experimental
set‐up allow arguably more general conclusions than classifiers that
only work with data from the same experimental set‐up. Future stud-
ies should also use validation samples.40
Cues were repeated and trial numbers were not perfectly balanced
across categories. We adjusted for this in our analyses and results
were stable. Here, model selection geared also towards reduced loss
aversion additionally characterizing GD, in line with.23,246 | CONCLUSION
Our results propose that GD subjects’ acceptance of mixed gambles is
cue‐dependent and that this cue‐dependency even lends itself to
distinguishing GD from HC subjects in out‐of‐sample data. However,
we did not observe that cues specifically shift loss aversion, neither
on average, nor in a way relevant to classification. We saw that espe-
cially gambling cues lead to increased gambling GD subjects. Observ-
ing increased PIT in GD suggests that PIT related to an addictive
disorder might not depend on the direct effect of a substance of
abuse, but on related learning processes17 or on innate traits.18 The
here reported effects should be explored further in larger, more
diverse and longitudinal GD samples as they could inform diagnostics,
therapy50 and public health policy.
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